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Maison: The Public Utility Regulatory Act Student Symposium - Public Util

THE PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY ACTThe history of public utility regulation in the United States is immersed in
principles of sovereign police power exercised to maintain and protect the
public interest. 20 5 The governmental prerogative of regulation has applied to
those industries supplying important resources and services in a structure
which insulates supplies from the normal risks of competition in the marketplace. 20 6 The regulation of public utilities has a long history, dating as far
back as ancient Rome. 20 7 The concept of regulation in economic areas
affecting the public interest was also recognized by English courts, 208 but
was not specifically recognized as a principle of law in the United States until
1877 when the Supreme Court approved the doctrine in Munn v. Illinois.209
The extent to which public utilities are monitored and regulated varies
greatly from state to state.2 10 Until the passage of the Public Utility
205. See Lovejoy, Regulation of Business: The Need For A Public Utility Concept, 3 S. TEX. L.J. 292, 294 (1958).
206. Traditionally the regulation of public utilities has been a substitute for the normal effects of competition.
[T]he goal of rate regulation is to provide a rate of return for public utilities that
will equal, over time, the rate of return earned in competitive industry adjusted, if
and when necessary, for differences in risk and uncertainty ....
West & Eubanks, Automatic Cost of Capital Model, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY,
May 22, 1975, at 27-28. There are, however, some types of competition which may exert some influence or impact on a given utility market. Five types of competition to
which an electric utility is subjected are:
1. Competition of industrial generating plants ...
2. Competition of substitute services ...
3. Competition of other electric utilities in cases where a business can be located
in any one of a number of utility territories.
4. Competition of government power projects ....
5. Competition for the consumer's dollar ....
R. CAYWOOD, ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE ECONOMICS 5 (1972 ed.); see McKie, Public Utility Regulation: Structure and Performance, in PERSPECTIVES IN PUBLIC REGULATION 85,

88-89 (M. Russell ed. 1973).
207. See GLARSER ' PUBLIC UTILrTEs IN AMERICAN CAPITALISM 196-97 (1957).
208. During the reign of King James I, the chief justice, Sir Matthew Hall, stated
that ferry boats charged with high rates and poor service "ought to be under a public
regulation, to wit, that it give attendance at due time, a boat in due order and take but
a reasonable toll." L. METCALF & V. REINEMER, OvERCHARGE 26 (1967).
209. 94 U.S. 113 (1877); accord, Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp.,

155 Tex. 502, 505, 289 S.W.2d 559, 561 (1956).
210. The variance of controls is obvious when reviewing the size and funding of the
various state regulatory bodies. Commissioners' terms are six years or more in 35 jurisdictions. They are appointed by the governor in most states, appointed by the President
of the United States in the District of Columbia, chosen by the legislature in two, and
elected in the remaining 12 (including the Texas Railroad Commission). FPC, FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION

JURISDICTION

AND REGULATION
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Regulatory Act (PURA) by the 64th Texas Legislature, 2 1' utility regulation
in Texas was governed by Article 1119 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes
in the case of cities and towns incorporated under the general laws of the
state, and by articles 1124 and 1175(12) in the case of special charter and
home rule cities. 212 With the exception of oil and gas utilities which have
been relegated to the control of the Texas Railroad Commission, 21 3 rate
regulation of public utilities has been, for the most part, under the purview
and control of city councils throughout the state, few of which have had the
resources and the benefit of the skilled staff required to comprehend the
technical nature of regulation and rate determination. 214 Not all utilities,
however, fall within incorporated areas and because of their intrastate
character do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission
in the case of electric utilities, or the Federal Communications Commission
in the case of intrastate long distance telephone service. 2 Thus no regulatory body is empowered to test the reasonableness of rate increases in this
area. Recently, however, the Supreme Court of Texas held that it was within
the constitutional authority of the Attorney General to seek a restraining
order prohibiting a privately owned telephone utility from initiating unreaTELEPHONE UTILITIES 126-27 (1973)

[hereinafter cited as FPC, FEDERAL AND STATE

COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATION].

In 1973 the total budget of the various state regulatory commissions ranged from

$292,000 in South Dakota to $12,175,000 in California. Id. at 138. In 1967, the staff
size of the various regulatory bodies ranged from seven to 795 and total expenditures
ranged from $102,000 to $10,277,915. FPC, FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATION 44-46 (1967); see FPC, FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATION 131-34, 138-40 (1973).
211. TEX. LAWS 1975, ch. 721, at 2327, introduced as H.B. 819 which was altered

considerably in House committee and in the Conference Committee which debated and
compromised the "consumer oriented" House version with a weaker Senate version.
212. TEX. LAws 1937, ch. 144, § 1, at 274, and TEx. LAWS 1921, ch. 48, at 152,
repealed in TEx. LAws 1975, ch. 721, at 2327.

Rural electrical cooperatives in Texas

are governed by the provisions of the Electric Co-operative Corporation Act, TEx. REv.

CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528b (1962) and subject to regulation by the Rural Electrification

Administration in Washington, D.C.

213. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6053, § 1 (1962).
214. The Supreme Court of Texas in Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas
Corp., 155 Tex. 502, 289 S.W.2d 559 (1956) recognized the inherent complexity in the

regulation of public utilities:

The vast quantity of legal writing on the judicial effort to evolve formulas for evaluating the property of utility companies would indicate that the courts may not have
had much more success than the professional economists.
Id. at 511, 289 S.W.2d at 564.
215. In setting local rates for telephone utilities, municipal home rule governing bodies have not been permitted to consider profits of the utility made through intrastate long
distance rate returns, nor have they been able to control long distance rates charged
within their municipal boundaries. City of Athens v. Gulf States Tel. Co., 380 S.W.2d
687, 689 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord, City of Carrollton v.
Southwestern States Tel. Co., 381 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); City of Weslaco v. General Tel. Co., 359 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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sonably high rates in statutorily unregulated areas of the state.216 The

limitation of prescribing reasonable rates in such areas is a legal obligation of
such a utility and a district court may determine the reasonableness of such
rate increase without exercising a legislative function which is prohibited by
2 17

the constitution.
As a result of the piecemeal scheme of utility regulation and the lack of
resources and expertise in most areas where regulation has been possible,
rate determination has varied substantially from one area of the state to
another. 218 Such disparity may also be observed when the profits of
privately owned telephone and electric utilities are weighted and compared
with the national average.2 19 In examining the rate of return on rate base
determinations 220 from 1969 to 1973, on only five occasions did a Texas
electric utility fall below the national average. 221 Even during those years
216. State v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1975).

217. Id. at 530-31.
218. Fulda, Telephone Regulation in Texas: Should Regulation by Cities Be Replaced by a State Commission?, 45 TExAs L. REV. 611, 647-49 (1967). The lack of
expertise available to the vast majority of municipal governments in dealing with the
complex area of utility regulation and rate determination is a serious defect in the concept of local control. The excessive cost of consultants, economists, investigators and
lawyers has placed utilities beyond effective regulation by municipalities. TExPIRG,
REGULATION OF TELEPHONE & ELECTRIC 'UTILITIEs 26-28 (1975); see D. Marshall, A
Proposal for the Regulation of Utilities in the State of Texas, 28-30, August, 1961 (unpublished thesis in University of Texas Library).
219. TExPIRG, REGULATION OF TELEPHONE & ELECTRIC UTILTEs 4-6, 12-13
(1975).
220. A rate of return on rate base is that amount determined to be a reasonable return on a regulated company's investments.
fImt is designed to permit the regulated company to set a rate schedule which will
produce the minimal revenues necessary to cover operating expenses, including
taxes, and a rate of return on the invested capital necessary to attract and retain
this invested capital.
Commonly the revenue requirement is expressed in the following way:
R = C (I-d)r
where R = revenue requirement,
C = cost of providing the service of the company, including depreciation
expenses and taxes,
I = total investment in plant and equipment,
d = accrued depreciation, and
r = rate of return allowed by the regulatory commission.
Murry, Practical Economics of Public Utility Regulation, in PERSPECTIVES IN PUBLIC
UTILITY REGULATION 35 (M. Russell ed. 1973).
221.

PRIVATELY OWNED TExAS ELECTRIC UTILITIES
RATE OF RETURN ON RATE BASE-1969-1973a

Central Power & Light

1969b
9.72

1970c
9.29

1971d
9.74

1972e
9.20

El Paso Electric

9.55

9.51

9.68

9.24

COMPANY

Community Public Service
Dallas Power & Light
Gulf States Utilitiesg
Houston Lighting & Power
Southwestern Electric Power
Southwestern Electric Service

7.66
7.57
7.98
9.52
7.47
7.64
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8.22
7.78

7.88
9.31
9.74
8.09

8.39
6.90

7.60
9.88
9.32
8.25

7.22
7.56

7.92
9.97
10.30
8.37

1973f
8.88
9.19
7.04

8.52

7.10
9.41
10.70
8.81
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when a Texas electric utility rate of return on rate base was lower than the
national average, an examination of the rate of return on common stock
equity for those same years illustrates that the return was always above the
222
national average.
Southwestern Public Service
Texas Electric Service
Texas Power and Light
West Texas Utilities
State Averageh
National Averagei

7.65
9.28
9.26
9.11
8.93
7.30

8.53
9.66
9.64
9.75
9.06
7.30

8.57
9.17
9.40
9.47
9.23
7.40

8.39
9.45
9.72
9.42
9.38
7.60

9.91
9.05
9.36
10.65
9.23
7.80

a. TExPIRG, REGULATION OF TELEPHONE & ELECTRIC UTILITIES 4 (1975).
b. FPC, STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED

STATES

d. FPC,

STATES

752-53 (1970).
c. Id.

STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED

732-33 (1971).
e. FPC, STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
732-33 (1972).
f. The 1973 statistics are derived from the following formula. The page and line
number indicate figures taken from the individual reports (Annual Report) for 1973.
Formula: 1973 Annual Report, p. 114, 1. 21, col. c or e
a+b+c+d
a = (p. 403, 1. 88, col. b + g) 2
[p. 408, 1. 1 (col. c + d) + 1. 17 c + d]
2
(p. 405, 1. 48/avg.) -

-

(p. 226, 1. 51 . . . 1. 57, col. b + f)
2

(p. 227, 1. 12, col. b+f) + (p. 351/avg.)
b= 0
c = (p. 110, 1. 26 c+d)

-

2

2
d = (p. 110, 1. 28 c+d)
2
[1/8 (p. 448, col. f) (p. 419, 1. 159, col. b) p. 418, 1. 75, b)] - .06 (p. 114, 1. 12, col. e)
g. Gulf States Utilities figures are for Texas operations for these years.
h. State averages for rate of return for the 12 companies are weighted averages based on
the total kilowatt-hour output for each company.
i. FPC, STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
732-33 (1972).
222.
PRIVATELY OWNED TEXAS ELECTRIC UTILITIES
RATE OF RETURN ON COMMON STOCK EQurry-1969-1973a
e

=

COMPANY

1969b

1970c

1971d

1972e

1973f

Central Power & Light
Community Public Service
Dallas Power & Light
El Paso Electric
Gulf States Utilitiesg
Houston Lighting & Power
Southwestern Electric Power

18.0
13.9
13.2
17.2
14.0
14.5
15.6

16.0
14.1
13.2
17.0
14.4
15.1
16.1

16.2
14.4
12.8
17.1
12.1
15.5
15.5

16.0
16.1
12.7
17.1
12.5
15.5
17.0

15.2
15.7
14.6
15.7
12.9
13.9
17.3
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The fact that the profits of privately owned electric utilities in Texas have
consistently been higher than the national average does not necessarily
justify the conclusion that the national average is a fair or reasonable return,
but because the returns are exorbitantly higher than the national average it is
logical to recognize that most companies have returns substantially lower and
yet have maintained their financial integrity.
[O]f the twelve largest electric companies (in terms of total revenue
required in 1971) in the United States, only three had above average
rates of return. None of them had a rate of return on its rate base as
high as 9%. Since the nation's largest companies must be requiring
relatively large amounts of capital, investors apparently do not feel
-thatrates of return in the 6-7% range are unreasonable or risky.228
Southwestern Electric Service
Southwestern Public Service
Texas Electric Service
Texas Power and Light
West Texas Utilities
State Averageh
National Averagei
a. TExPIRG, REGULATION OF
b. FPC,

FPC,

TELEPHONE

13.7
17.9
17.3
16.8
16.4
15.9
11.8

& ELECTRIC

14.1
16.8
16.1
16.3
15.8
15.6
11.7

UTILITIES

14.2
15.7
16.4
16.7
15.4
15.8
11.8
5 (1975).

STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED

756-57 (1970).
c. Id.
d. FPC, STATISTICS
735-36 (1971).

e.

12.9
15.8
16.8
16.6
15.5
15.6
12.2

14.9
16.1
15.6
15.3
16.3
15.1
11.5
STATES

OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILrrIIS IN THE UNITED STATES

STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

735-36 (1972).
f. The percent rate of return on common stock equity in 1973 is determined according
to the following formula:
earnings available for equity X 100

common equity
Definitions:
earnings available for equity: FPC ANN. REP. 116A, 1. 63 - 117, 1. 29 (1973).
common equity: Id. at 111, 1. 13 - 1. 2.
g. Gulf States Utilities is not included in the state averages. All figures for GSU are
based on Texas operations only.
h. State averages are weighted averages determined by the following formula:
% rate of return on common equity X KWH output for company
total KWH state output
FPC, STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC
UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 734 (1972).
The 1973 average was determined by
weighting the 1972 national average with the 1973 averages for Texas.
223. TExPIRG, REGULATION OF TELEPHONE & ELECTRIC UTILrnES 6-7 (1975).
A
regulatory agency must be able to recognize that the public interest can be protected only
through the maintenance of a careful analysis of all factors relevant in rate base determinations.
The legal atmosphere within which regulatory agencies operate has tended to emphasize their role as arbiters between conflicting interests, while the concern of the
regulated companies for the state of their earnings and their stance vis-h-vis the -regulatory agencies has tended to cause them to pay relatively little attention to any
efficiency-promoting innovations that would not yield them a fairly immediate financial gain.
Vickrey, Economic Efficiency and Pricing, in PUBLIC PRICES FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTS 53
i. National averages for 1969-1972:

(S. Mushkin ed. 1972).
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224
Texas is the last state to create a public utility regulatory commission.
It is debatable, however, whether such a commission can forestall the rising
utility rates within the state. What it can establish is a statewide depository of
experts capable of digesting the complexities of regulation and rate structure
and determination previously absent in Texas.
STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION

The Public Utility Regulatory Act introduces Texas' first agency established to regulate most public utilities through a commission composed of
three individuals appointed by the governor and confirmed by a two-thirds
vote of the state senate. 225 This process of selection through gubernatorial
appointment is utilized by a majority of the states. 226 Thus, the process of
selection under the Texas Act is not atypical, yet it is not without its
imperfections.
Ideally gubernatorial appointment will remove the commissioners from the
maze of political considerations characteristic of elective offices and will
better enable each commissioner to make his or her decision without a
searching eye on the next election or the next public opinion poll. The
disadvantage is the elimination of direct electoral accountability. The element of election cannot be entirely disregarded since the gubernatorial
227
election will determine the orientation of the appointed commissioners.
The advantage of a small commission over a large one is a positive feature in
that accountability of the body to the public will be facilitated by the fact
that the electorate can better pursue the voting records of commission
members. Such accountability is, however, also indirect in that it will be only
through the governor or the senate that the public is able to exercise control
over the composition of the commission.
The effectiveness of the commission was seriously jeopardized between the
first House passage of PURA and the bill as it was finally passed by both
houses of the legislature by the inclusion of an "opt-in" and "opt-out"
224. FPC, FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATION 3-15
(1973); see PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, December 5, 1974, at 50.
225. TEx. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 5, at 2331.
226. Commissioners are appointed by the governor in 35 states, selected by the legislature in two, appointed by the President of the United States in the District of Columbia, and elected by citizens in the remaining 12 (including the Texas Railroad Commis-

sion).

FPC,

FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATION

126-27

(1973).

227. One source states:
The governor appoints the utility commissions in two thirds of the states, thus the

gubernatorial election often decides the orientation of a majority of the commission.
With an unparalleled apparatus for getting their message into community organiza-

tions and media, utilities can swing elections. And they do.

L METCALF & V.

REINEMER, OVERCHARGE

230 (1967).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol7/iss3/7
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procedure for municipalities. 228 Municipalities under the Act include cities
and incorporated villages or towns existing, created, or organized under the
general, home-rule, or special laws of the state.2 29 With the exception of
intrastate telephone regulation, 230 it is possible that the jurisdiction, and thus
the effectiveness, of the commission may be hampered. The Conference
Committee version, which finally passed both houses of the legislature on
June 2, 1975, permits a municipality to elect to surrender its "exclusive
original jurisdiction" over electric, water and sewer utilities within its political
boundaries to the commission any time after September 1, 1977 by ordinance or by a vote of the electorate. 231 A municipality may reinstate its
exclusive original jurisdiction by a vote of the electorate at any time except
when a case involving that municipality is pending before the commis2
sion. 32 When the exclusive original jurisdiction of a municipal governing
body is reinstated it must be retained for a minimum of five years, thus
23 3
precluding regulation by the commission under such circumstances.
Areas outside the incorporated limits of a municipality are without the
234
option to exercise jurisdiction over electric, water and sewer utility rates.
Thus, all rural and extra-municipal rate determinations will automatically
fall under the control of the commission on September 1, 1976.235 Likewise
all telecommunications will automatically come within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the commission after the same date. 23 6
228. Compare H.B. 819, 64th Legislature (1975) as originally passed by the House
of Representatives on May 18, 1975 with the Public Utilities Regulatory Act, TEx.
LAws 1975, ch. 721, at 2337, as finally passed and signed by the governor on June 2,
1975. Exclusive original jurisdiction over utility regulation remains with municipalities.
They must take action, through ordinance or vote of the electorate, to "opt-in" to commission jurisdiction. They also have the prerogative to "opt-out" and reinstate their jurisdiction. TEx. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 17(b), (c), at 2335.
229. TEx. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 3(b), at 2328.
230. The exclusive original jurisdiction over all telephone utilities in Texas is vested
in the new commission. TEx. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 18, at 2335.
231. The exclusive original jurisdiction over electric, water and sewer utilities remains
with municipal governing bodies in Texas unless their jurisdiction is surrendered. TEx.
LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 17(a), (b), at 2334-35. Most states have not allotted to municipalities the authority to control utilities or rates within their boundaries. FPC, FEDERAL
AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION

16 (1973).

232. Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 721, § 17(c).
233. Id.
234. Id. § 17(e), at 2335.
235. Id. § 87(b), at 2352.
236. Id. § 18, at 2335. Telecommunication utilities have been governed by TEx.
LAws 1937, ch. 144, § 1, at 274 (formerly article 1119 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes). The weakness of the former law has been discussed by the late Professor Carl
Fulda in Telephone Regulation in Texas: Should Regulation by Cities Be Replaced by
a State Commission?, 45 TExAs L. REV. 611 (1967):
Under Texas law the statewide method of fixing telephone rates, extolled by the
New York and Utah commissions, is impossible because each Texas city represents
a separate sovereignty and there exists no coordinating agency with authority to order [telephone] exchanges of approximately equal size to adopt the same rates.
Id. at 617.
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While the weakness of the "opt-in" provision may startle the wary urban
consumer, it should be noted that no single governmental body has necessarily been the safe refuge of the rate payer. While there are those who have
contended that the courts are best suited to "legislate" in the area of public
utility regulation and the determination of the proper exercise of such police
power, 28 7 the courts in Texas have repeatedly recognized rate-making and
28
regulation of utilities as a legislative function. ,
Two factors appear to be essential in utility regulation by any governmental body: expertise 239 and the public interest. 240 The new commission will

employ an experienced director of public utilities, a chief engineer who is
237. Lovejoy, Regulation of Business: The Need For a Public Utility Concept, 3 S.
TEx. L.J. 292, 295 (1958).
238. See, e.g., Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 306, 153 S.W.2d 681, 696
(1941); Texas Gas Utilities Co. v. City of Uvalde, 77 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Tex. Civ. App.
-San Antonio 1934, no writ). In Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp.,
155 Tex. 502, 289 S.W.2d 559 (1956), the supreme court questioned the judicial success
of rate determination, and held that "[ilt is fundamental that in Texas the fixing of
domestic utility rates is a legislative function of the state government. . . ." Id. at 506,
289 S.W.2d at 562; accord, City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 263 S.W.2d
169, 171-72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1953, writ ref'd). The constitutionality of particular statutes giving the district courts certain appellate functions in utility rate determinations has been questioned. Newcomb, Some Aspects of Regulation of Public Utilities Operating in Texas, 5 BAYLOR L. REv. 335, 337-38 (1953). The Supreme Court
of Texas recently held that,
the determination of whether rates fixed by the utility are unreasonably high is a
judicial function....
It is one thing to inquire whether the rates which have been charged and collected
are reasonable-that is a judicial act; but an entirely different thing to prescribe
rates which shall be charged in the future-that is a legislative act.
State v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. 1975).
239. The Supreme Court of Texas recently noted the extensive assets of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and the magnitude of the regulatory task as a
consequence. Quoting a report of the FCC, the court observed that the
lack of resources is an even more serious problem for State and municipal regulatory bodies. And the splintering of jurisdiction between the Federal Government
and the States undoubtedly contributes further to the deterioration of effective, coordinated regulation. A.T.&T. is so much bigger, and better financed, than any
government agency it confronts that even the process of selecting which information
it will offer the regulator gives the whole operation a substantial aura of self-evaluation.
In the Matter of American Telephone & Telegraph Co. and The Associated Bell System
Companies, etc., 9 F.C.C.2d 30 (1967), quoted in State v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
526 S.W.2d 526, 532 (Tex. 1975).
240. The fact that the public interest is represented by regulatory bodies unable to
cope with the specialized aspects of utility regulation is commonly observed. Ideally,
a commission should be "consumer oriented," if for no other reason than to balance the
effects of power and organization characteristic of utility companies.
The commission must represent the public in order that the interests of the unorganized many are not compromised by the organized few. The idea--sometimes
voiced-that the interests of the utility and the interests of the public are one and
the same seems to me a Reader's Digest view of the universe and largely without
foundation. They are not the same in important respects, and the commission must
be "on the side" of the consumer.
D. JONES, NEw CONCEPTS AND CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 62-63
(1963), quoted in L. METCALF &V. REINEMER, OVERCHARGE 90-91 (1967).
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registered and experienced in public utility engineering and rate determination, a chief accountant, and a director of research experienced in the area of
industrial economics and analysis. 24 1 No longer will utility companies
present their facts and figures before persons unskilled in dealing with such
criteria utilized in rate structure and the determination of reasonable returns.2 42 By stipulating the requirement of expertise in the various functionaries of the commission, it would be reasonable to expect an improvement in
the manner in which data is synthesized and translated into equitable rate
determinations.
In addition to the expert personnel who will deal primarily with the
technical aspects of utility regulation, a general counsel and staff are
specifically charged with the "protection and representation of the public
interest before the commission;" 243 it is this division of the new commission
that will be responsible for conducting investigations of the utilities under the
jurisdiction of the regulatory body. 244 Article five of the new Act prescribes
the manner in which such information is to be obtained, in addition to
24 5
prescribing uniform methods of depreciation, amortization, or depletion
and the type and manner in which data is to be kept by the utilities and
246
uiltmately rendered to the commission.
The conflict of interest provisions, if enforced, will minimize the threat of
an industry-controlled or dominated agency. 247 The Conference Committee
compromises to the bill which was first passed by the House of Representatives resulted in stronger conflict of interest provisions which prohibit any
commissioner or any staff member from having any pecuniary interest in any
public utility, including ownership or control of any securities therein, for a
period of two years prior or subsequent to an individual's tenure on the
commission. 248 The enforcement of these provisions is left with the Attorney
241. TEX. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 8(b)(1)-(4), at 2333.
242. Acquiring qualified staff personnel to deal effectively with proposed rate in-

creases is a costly and complex matter for municipalities in Texas. TEXAS MUNICIPAL
LEAGUE, TELEPHONE RATES IN TEXAS CrriEs 3 (1974).
243. Tx. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 8(c)(7), at 2333.
244. In TEX. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 8(c)(3), at 2333, the general counsel and staff
are given the authority to conduct investigations of public utilities under commission jurisdiction. When a municipality retains or recaptures its jurisdiction over utility regulation it is vested with the right to exercise the same regulatoiy powers as the commission.
Id. § 22, at 2336. A municipal governing body may also conduct its own investigations
in the same manner as the general counsel, had jurisdiction'been surrendered by the municipality to the commission. Id. § 24, at 2336-37. The commission, upon request, is
permitted to assist municipalities in proceedings involving regulation and rate determination, including the production of testimony by members of the commission. Id. § 25,
at 2337, and § 28(b), at 2339.
245. Id. § 17(b), (e), at 2338. See also Id. § 28(a) (2), at 2338.
246. Id. § 27(a), at 2337-38.
247. id. § 6, at 2331-32.
248. Id. § 6(a), (b), at 2331.
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General 249 who would be permitted to seek a civil penalty of $1,000 for
each knowing violation of section SiX25O in addition to a criminal penalty for
251
the willful and knowing violation of the conflict of interest provisions.
RATE DETERMINATION BY THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION

The implementation of commission review of rates alleged to be unreasonable, departs from prior Texas law which limited such review to the district
courts but only after the city council first sought such judicial determination. 252 The commission may act sua sponte or upon the complaint of any
2 53
affected person to review rates that are alleged to be unreasonable.
Citizens of a municipality as well as public utilities may appeal to the
commission or to the Railroad Commission, whichever is appropriate, for
review of rates which have been set by the municipal governing body. 25 4 A
citizen appeal must conform with the prescription of a petition for review
which is to be signed by 20,000 qualified voters or 10 percent of the
qualified voters, whichever is less. 2 55 Petitions must be filed with the
appropriate commission within 30 days of the final rate determination made
by the municipal governing body. 25 6 The matter is then required to be heard
257
de novo and rates set according to the findings made by the commission.
In order to determine the rates to be set, the commission is governed by a
formula which sets a percentage for the adjusted value of the utility's
property. 258 This represents a departure by Texas from the concept of "fair
249. Id. § 72(c), at 2349.
250. Id. § 73(a), at 2349.
251. Id. § 74(a), at 2349. A violation of the provisions of section six carries a
criminal penalty of third degree felony. The punishment prescribed for conviction of
this class of offense is imprisonment of not less than two nor more than 10 years and a
discretionary fine not to exceed $5,000. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.34 (1974).
252. TEX. LAWS 1975, ch. 145, at 348 (formerly Article 1125 of the Texas Revised
Civil Statutes). See Reschenthaler, The Legal Background of Electric Utility Regulation in Texas-An Economist's View, 21 BAYLOR L REV. 295, 297 (1969).
253. Tax. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 42, at 2342. See also Id. § 83, at 2351. "'Affected person' means . . .any person or corporation whose utility service or rates are
affected by any proceeding before the regulatory authority...." Id. § 3(h), at 2329.
This provision regarding standing before the commission for review or complaint is typical of other states' requirements. FPC, FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION
AND REGULATION 17 (1973).
254. TEx. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 26(a), (b), at 2337.
255. Id. § 26(c), at 2337.
256. Id. § 26(d), at 2337.
257. Id. § 26(e), at 2337.
258. The Act establishes certain guidelines within which the commission may exercise its discretion in setting value on utility properties:
Utility rates shall be based upon the adjusted value of property. . . . The adjusted
value of such property shall be a reasonable balance between original cost less depreciation and current cost less an adjustment for both present age and condition.
The regulatory authority shall have the discretion to determine a reasonable balance
that reflects not less than 60% nor more than 75% original cost . . .and not less
than 25% nor more than 40% current cost . ...
Id. § 41(a), at 2341-42.
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value"259 which has tended to result in comparatively higher value bases
than the concept of "depreciated original cost," utilized by a majority of state
regulatory commissions, 260 because the replacement cost of property will
ordinarily be much greater than its original cost. 261 Potential difficulty could
result, however, if the new commission is unable to act efficiently in making
rate adjustments which are responsive to a fluctuating and unstable economy. If privately owned utilities are unable to attract investors and maintain
their confidence as a result of losses to investors, such utilities will be
2 62
hindered and services will deteriorate.
Since 1964 the risk return status of utility investment in the nation has
fallen off considerably, and regulatory bodies have been the target of
criticism for their failure to develop techniques and methods which would
permit the regulatory process to be more responsive to capital market
conditions. 263 Section 39 of the Act expressly charges the commission to fix
259. See Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp., 155 Tex. 502, 289 S.W.2d
559 (1956).
Fair value represents one of various value bases utilized in rate determination, others being the trended original cost and the reproduction cost. Fair value has
been defined as "[a]n amount which might lie somewhere between book cost and reproduction cost . . . ." R. CAYWOOD, ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE ECONOMICS 176 (1972).
In Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1897) the Supreme Court listed six elements
to be taken into consideration for fair value determination: (1) original cost of construction; (2) amount spent for permanent improvements; (3) number and market value
of stocks and bonds; (4) present value of the property as compared with the original
cost of construction; (5) probable earning capacity under various rates; and (6) the
amount required to meet operating expenses.
260. Twenty-nine states utilize the original cost valuation standard, or variations
thereof, in determining rate base. FPC, FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION
AND REGULATION 50 (1973).
261. L. METCALF & V. REINEMER, OVERCHARGE 61 (1967). An abandonment of the
entire concept of property rate valuation is advocated in Dunlap, It Is Time For A
Change, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, March 27, 1975, at 25-26.
262. See Brophy, The Utility Problem of Regulatory Lag, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, January 30, 1975, at 21.
263. The regulatory lag of utility commissions in failing to respond to capital market
changes has been cited as a cause of declining earnings:
Over this last decade, the utilities' risk return status has so deteriorated that investors
have lost much of the confidence they once had in utilities because utilities' stocks
have performed so poorly compared to investor expectations. Currently, the utilities find it much more difficult and expensive to attract investors' capital ....
The risk differential which formerly existed (prior to and up through the mid1960's) in favor of utilities as compared to industrial firms no longer exists; indeed,
the utilities as a group are now more risky than high-grade industrials as a group.
This change is primarily attributable to the unprecedented inflation that has occurred since the mid-1960's and to the deeply ingrained expectation that we shall
not soon achieve relative price level stability. These facts, plus the problem of regulatory lag, and in many cases, inadequate upward adjustments in allowed rates of
return by commissions at both federal and state levels, have resulted in the failure
of utility earnings to keep pace with earnings in the industrial sector.
West & Eubanks, Automatic Cost of Capital Model, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY
May 22, 1975, at 28-31. See also Lerner, Impact of Competition on Rate of Return,
PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, December 5, 1974, at 28-33. Contra, TExPIRG, REGULATION OF TELEPHONE

& ELECTRIC

UTILITIES

2-7 (1975).
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rates that would enable a utility "to recover its operating expenses together
with a reasonable return on its invested capital. 264 The degree to which this
can be accomplished is dependent upon the expertise with which the
commission staff is able to analyze all relevant data with regard to rate
adjustment, and the extent to which hearings on statements of intent to effect
rate changes are expedited. 265 By abandoning the concept of fair value and
thus dealing with fewer intangibles and a more accurate reflection of actual
cost, the commission will have the capacity to permit both a reasonable
return for the utility and its investors, and to determine rates which are fixed
266
in a manner that is fair to the consumer.
Equipped with subpoena power 267 and the authority to inspect any books,
accounts and records of a utility, 268 including information regarding affiliates 269 and interests within and without the State of Texas, 270 the commission will be able to acquire a sufficient composite of data to enable it to
271
consider an entire business enterprise, rather than a mere subunit thereof.
Regulation and rate determination will assume a feature of investigative
analysis of the holdings and returns of an entire utility operation not possible
under former Texas law. Consideration of the entire business enterprise will
include not only affiliated interests, but also the net income of a public
utility, specifically any tax benefits which accrue to a consolidated utility
which would not otherwise be required to reduce the cost of its property by
2 72
the intercompany profits realized.
Lobbying expenditures are expressly prohibited from entering into ratemaking determinations, and the regulatory commission is vested with discre264. TEx. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 39, at 2341.

265. There is no provision in the Act for an automatic cost of capital adjustment to
rates. "No utility may make changes in its rates except by filing a statement of intent
. ..at least 35 days prior to the effective date of the proposed change." Id.§ 43(a),
at 2343.
266. The importance of rate base determination is illustrated by the following formula:
Three elements are involved in the determination of allowable earnings, namely,
utility plant and accrued depreciation-the two elements used to determine rate base
or property value-and rate of return which, when considered in connection with
rate base, gives total allowable earnings ....
The earnings formula can be stated
thus:
Utility plant
-

Accrued depreciation ...

= Rate base

X Rate of return
= Allowable earnings

R. CAYWOOD, ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE ECONOMICS 174-75 (1972 ed.).

267. TEx. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 29(a), at 2339.
268. Id.H§ 27(d), 29(a), at 2338-39.
269. Id.§ 3(i), at 2329.
270. Id.§ 28(a)(1), at 2338.
271. See General Tel. Co. v. City of Wellington, 156 Tex. 238, 245-46, 294 S.W.2d
385, 390 (1956).
272. TEx. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 41(c)(2), at 2342.
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tion to exclude consumption-inducing and public relations advertising expenses if the commission determines that such expenditures are unreasonable or
not in the public interest. 273 The limitation on expenses allowable in
consumption oriented advertising could represent an aggregate savings to
Texas consumers of more than $33,000,000 based on the expenditures made
by privately owned electric utilities in 1972.274 It should be noted that
although most states have the authority to limit such expenses, 275 more than
$314,000,000 was spent by privately owned electric utilities nationwide in
that same year. 276 The commission may require each utility to submit an
annual report delineating the expenditures made in these and in related
27 7
matters.
A utility is required to give at least 35 days notice prior to the effective
date of a proposed rate change to the regulatory authority having jurisdiction
over that utility. 278 In addition, notice by publication is required once each
week for four weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in each county
where rates will be affected by the change.2 7 9 The commission is required to
hold hearings within 30 days of the date on which the change has been or
would be effective either on its own motion or on a complaint filed by any
273. Id. § 30, at 2339.
274. FPC, STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 501-27A (1972). It should be noted that privately owned electric utilities in
Texas have spent nearly six times the dollar amount in advertising and sales than in
research and development. Listed are the expenditures in each category made by privately owned electric utilities operating in Texas in 1972:
ADVERTISING AND SALES EXPENSES AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
EXPENSES OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN TExAs--1972a

COMPANY

Houston Lighting & Power Co.
Gulf States Utilities Co.d

West Texas Utilities Co.
Central Power & Light Co.
Texas Electric Service Co.
Dallas Power & Light Co.
Southwestern Electric Power Co.
Texas Power & Light Co.
El Paso Electric Co.
Community Public Service Co.
Southwestern Public Service Co.

Southwestern Electric Service Co.
TOTALS
a. FPC, STATISTICS

$Research &
Developmentb

$Advertising
& Salesc

R & D%
of A & S

2,846,147
545,955
104,672
377,040
620,394
365,495
204,015
444,786
31,935
32,035
55,713

4,382,132
2,602,440
861,150
3,138,981
5,864,501
3,488,947
2,933,599
6,528,604
548,849
982,294
2,041,276

65.0
21.0
12.2
12.0
10.6
10.5
7.0
6.8
5.8
3.3
2.7

5,628,187

33,536,714

163,941

0

OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC

-

UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

(1972).
b. Id.at 741-44.
c. Id.at 509A, 523-24A.
d. Includes operations within and without the State of Texas.
275. FPC,
(1973).

FEDERAL

AND

STATE COMMISSION

JURISDICTION

AND

REGULATION

38

276. FPC, STATISTICS, supra note 274.
277. TEX. LAWS 1975, ch. 721, § 30, at 2339.
278. Id. § 43(a), at 2343.
279. id.§ 43(a), at 2343.
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person affected by the proposed change. 280 When a "major change" in rates
is proposed the commission is required to hold a hearing in every case,2 8 ' but
when no protest of the change has been filed an "informal hearing" is
permitted. 282 The commission is vested with the authority to suspend any
proposed change in rates for a period of 120 days, followed by an extension
not to exceed another 30 days. 28 3 If there is no final determination made on
the proposal for rate change, the proposal is to be regarded as having been
approved, subject only to the final determination of the commission in a
284
hearing already in progress.
If the utility initiates a change in rates in any amount found to be
unreasonable or in excess of the final determination of the commission, such
amounts realized must be refunded or credited with interest to the rate
payers.285 Prior Texas law utilized the concept of "water over the dam," and
a utility was not required to return excessive profits to the consumer since
the authority to fix rates was deemed not to apply to rates already
288
collected.
The commission is financed by an initial appropriation in the amount of
$2,501,200.28 7 Augmenting this amount is an assessment of one-sixth of one
percent of the gross receipts on rates charged by utilities to Texas consumers. 288 This amount is intended to defray the cost of commission operations
year to year by the commission,
and regulation, and may be adjusted from
28 9
legislature.
the
of
approval
the
to
subject
CONCLUSION

The creation of a Public Utility Regulatory Commission for the State of
280. Id. § 43(c), at 2343.
281. A major change in rates is defined as "an increase in rates which would increase
the aggregate revenues of the applicant more than the greater of $100,000 or two and
one-half percent ...... Id. § 43(b), at 2343.
282. Id. § 43(c), at 2343.
283. Id. § 43(d), at 2343.
284. Id. § 43(d), at 2343.
285. Id. § 43(e), at 2344.
286. City of El Paso v. El Paso City Lines, 227 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
287. This amount represents the total for the biennium. For the year ending August
31, 1976, $1,244,000 was appropriated; for the year ending August 31, 1977, the legislature has appropriated $1,257,200. TEx. LAws 1975, ch. 743, at 2416. The Act's assessment and appropriation placed Texas in reasonable conformity with other jurisdictions.
Twelve states finance their state regulatory commissions exclusively from general tax
funds, 14 states finance from taxes and fees levied on utilities, and the remainder utilize
a combination of the two methods. FPC, FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURIsDICTION AND REGULATION 136 (1973).
288. Tx. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 78, at 2350.
289. ld. §§ 78, 79, at 2350. With regard to constitutional due process questions of
assessments made upon utilities for the cost of investigation and regulation see Washington Ry. & Elec. Co. v. District of Columbia, 77 F.2d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1935), where
expenses of investigations and proceedings borne by the public utility as a franchise tax
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Texas represents a significant achievement for the consumer. 290 The abandonment of the fair value method in the formulation of rate bases, which
excludes lobbying expenses and limits allowable expenditures in advertising
and public relations, are noteworthy features of the new law. The conflict of
interest provisions prescribing civil and criminal penalties for their violation
are also important features to weigh when considering the positive aspects
of the Public Utilities Regulatory Act.
The most important function of the commission will be to regulate the
profits of those utilities within its jurisdiction in such a manner as to be an
effective substitute for the forces of competition extant in other business
enterprises not so protected by law. 2 9 ' The Act provides the commission
with the potential by which it can control the pervasive lack of uniformity in
29 2
rate determinations which have burdened the Texas consumer in the past.
There are serious weaknesses with the new law that must be noted in
addition to the features just mentioned. The retention of exclusive original
jurisdiction by municipal governing bodies in the regulation of utilities,
except telephone utilities, will only weaken the effectiveness of the commission. Except for regulation in rural areas, the jurisdiction of the commission
is dependent upon affirmative action by municipal governing bodies, or
citizen action which will place the matter before the electorate. The exclusion
of a municipality from commission regulation for a five year period after
such governing body has reasserted its jurisdictional prerogative is an
additional fragmentation of regulatory power of the commission. To some
extent the resources of the state regulatory commission will be available on
request to assist a municipality retaining or recapturing its jurisdiction over
utilities, 293 but the maintenance of local control offers Texas a mere
continuation of piecemeal regulation.
The creation of a public utility commission can offer only qualified relief
for Texas consumers already burdened with high utility costs. A centralized
state regulatory body with the capacity and expertise to coordinate, compile
and analyze all relevant factors in determining a rate which is reasonable
both for the utility and the consumer can operate to eliminate the regional
disparities of rates in Texas. Whether or not such capacity is effectual will
depend primarily on the commissioners and on municipalities capable of
assessing their limitations in dealing with those utilities within their jurisdiction.
were not unconstitutional when such expenses could be charged to the operating expenses of the company. See TEX. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 41(b), (c), at 2342.
290. Formidable opposition to statewide utility regulation in Texas has been commonplace. See, PUBLIC UTLiTIs FORTNIGHTLY, December 5, 1974, at 50; Tim TEXAS
OBSERVER, VOL. LXVII, No. 12, June 20, 1975, at 10.
291. R. CAYWOOD, ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE ECONOMICS

174 (1972 ed.).

292. Fulda, Telephone Regulation in Texas: Should Regulation by Cities Be Replaced
by a State Commission?, 45 TExAs L. REV. 611, 649 (1967).
293. TEx. LAws 1975, ch. 721, § 28(b), at 2339.
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